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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
ABSTRACT
A critical requirement of the United States Defense Strategy is Power Projection. Power Projection is dependent upon Strategic Mobility. The capabilities of the United States Strategic Mobility Triad are not sufficient to meet the current challenges facing the Combatant Commander in the world today.
The United States must be able to move forces around the world to project power and protect its interests. Currently, the United States lacks the ability to project land power at the speed and tempo required by the Combatant Commander's in today's Current Operational Environment (COE) characterized with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. This Strategic Mobility problem limits their ability to deter conflict, respond with sufficient land-power to prevent escalation of a crisis or expansion of the conflict, or to defeat opponents quickly and decisively. The future operational environment will be characterized by a wide variety of potential national and transnational adversaries with capabilities ranging the full spectrum with divergent motives to do major harm to the United States homeland and national interests and to those of our allies. Crises will develop rapidly which will require swift response by U.S. Forces. These crises will run the gambit from humanitarian missions to peacemaking missions to combating terrorism to major combat operations to countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Such operations will take place in areas where the U.S. has little or no footprint and in countries that have little or no developed infrastructure. They will lack major ports, rail and road networks, and modern airfields. These countries may not be conducive to rapid entry. Furthermore, the adversary could adopt anti-access and areadenial measures which would force the United States to utilize forcible entry. Forces must Respond to the full spectrum of crises in order to protect our national interests. It further states that as we pursue shaping and responding activities, we must also take steps to Prepare Now for an uncertain future. 7 The 1999 National Security Strategy states, "Strategic mobility is the key element of our strategy. It is critical for allowing the United States to be first on the scene with assistance in many domestic or international crises, and is a key to successful American leadership and engagement. Deployment and sustainment of U.S. and multinational forces requires maintaining and ensuring access to sufficient fleets of aircraft, ships, vehicles and trains, as well as bases, ports, pre-positioned equipment and other infrastructure. 8 In October 1999, the United States Army Chief of Staff announced a strategic mobility requirement of moving a medium brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, deploy a division in 120 hours and deploy five divisions in 30 days.
In 2000, the Army Science board published a study in which it made a very profound and still relevant statement, "…a highly lethal and survivable force incapable of rapid deployment was not relevant in a power projection Army. Likewise, a highly deployable "light" force with limited lethality and survivability is not a likely deterrent to a determined foe. 9 The 2004 National Military Strategy stated, "Overlapping major combat operations place major demands on strategic mobility. Achieving objectives in such operations requires robust sealift, airlift, aerial refueling and pre-positioned assets.
Strategic mobility that supports these operations also requires supporting equipment to store, move and distribute materiel and an information infrastructure to provide real-time visibility of the entire logistics chain. The 2001 QDR set deployment goals for two different strategies. The first was to simultaneously defend the single homeland, conduct deterrence in four regions of the globe; execute two major campaigns in swift fashion -winning one of them by taking over the enemy's capital. The second strategy calls for delivering needed forces to a theater within 10 days of a deployment order, swiftly defeating the enemy there within 30 days, and resetting the force 30 days after that victory. 12 The 2006 QDR does not address specific requirements but it does give the following guidance, "Mobility capabilities will be fully integrated across geographic theaters and between warfighting components and force providers, with response times measured in hours and days rather than weeks". 13 It goes on to state, "the future force will be expeditionary and will increasingly use host-nation facilities with only modest supporting U.S. presence, decreasing the need for traditional overseas main operating bases with large infrastructures and reducing exposure to asymmetric threats. days deploying on time with 50% over five days late and during the second phase of activation at C+119 an additional 26 ships were activated with only four on time and over 50% were over 10 days late. 25 The problems continued after the terrorist attacks of There are a few challenges when it comes to the APS. First and the hardest to overcome are the ships utilized for the APS. During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, three pre-positioned LMSRs were unable to unload their cargo because their draft prevented them from entering any port. After two weeks of trying to locate a suitable port, the ships returned to Diego Garcia without discharging their cargo. 28 The advantage provided by the size of these ships is also a disadvantage since it limits the choice of ports. The second challenge is that the transport problem crosses over to the landbased pre-positioned equipment. During Kosovo, the United States deployed two LSVs to provide intra-theater lift to transport heavy equipment between the Balkans and Italy.
It took 23 days to move the LSVs from CONUS to the equipment site in Italy. 31 The problem with land-based pre-positioned stocks, unless the conflict is within 100 miles of the site, is they are difficult to move at the speed required by the Combatant Commander.
Lastly The Strategic Mobility Triad has many weaknesses. Waiting for future platforms is not the answer. This is just one way to fix the problem. There may be others but none that pass the common sense test. This dilemma must be analyzed holistically as a Joint problem. It is not a single Service problem and therefore, cannot be approached as one.
Conclusion
As I stated at the beginning of the paper, Strategic Mobility has not been fixed and is the weakest link in the strategic chain of getting the right forces, to the proper place in space and time in order to allow the Combatant Commander to either deter, deescalate, or decisively defeat an adversary. The United States cannot afford to rely on possible Host Nation or Allied Nation support. Nor can it rely on limited air transport and slow sealift to get our forces quickly to the crisis area. The United States must quit paying lip service to the shortfalls in our Strategic Mobility Triad and leverage the available technology and create a truly inter-
